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Characterizations of Canadian 
Strikes 
Some Critical Comments 
Michael R. Smith 
This paper examines examples of two différent intellectual 
traditions within which Canadian strikes are interpreted. The 
distinctiveness of the two traditions becomes most clear in reac-
tions to a paper by Crispo and Arthurs (1968) on industrial con-
flict in the mid i960*s. Each tradition involves assumptions 
about the nature of industrial conflict. In neither of the ex-
amples discussed from the two traditions, however, is the ade-
quacy ofthe assumptions really established. Despite thefact that 
thèse two traditions assert entirely contradictory characteriza-
tions of Canadian strikes, there appears to be no serious 
dialogue between the exponents of either position. 
Some conception of the nature of a social phenomenon is a prerequisite 
for any attempt to explain it. Often, however, social researchers operating 
within différent intellectual traditions appear to be so strongly wedded to 
the particular characterization of the phenomenon which prevails within 
their chosen tradition that the process of research itself is seriously com-
promised. For while, in principle, scientific enquiry is supposed to involve 
sifting through alternative explanations by comparing the relative extent to 
which one or another explanation is consistent with available data, in fact, 
the process of social research ail to often resembles a dialogue of the deaf. 
People write and do research which serves to reaffirm the characterization 
which is the orthodoxy of their preferred intellectual tradition without 
seriously engaging the problems raised within alternative traditions. 
We can see this rather clearly in récent treatments of Canadian strikes, 
and especially clearly in reactions to some assertions made in the Report of 
the Task Force on Canadian Industrial Relations (the Woods Report). 
Those assertions were, in turn, based upon an article by Crispo and Arthurs 
(1968). The crux of the assertions in question was that Canadian workers in 
the mid i960's were displaying a rather distinctive militancy which showed 
itself in a number of ways. In this short paper I outline and criticize two 
alternative and contradictory interprétations of industrial conflict in 
Canada in the mid and late i960's: one of those interprétations proceeds on 
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the assumption that the conclusion of the Woods Report with respect to 
symptoms of a distinctive militancy in the mid 1960's is correct and builds a 
particular characterization of Canadian strikes on the basis of that conclu-
sions; the other offers an alternative characterization through a rejection of 
the militancy conclusions of the Woods Report. In what follows I will try to 
show that there are serious inadequacies in the characterization of Canadian 
strikes that serves as an empirical justification for each of thèse interpréta-
tions1. 
CONTRADICTORY CHARACTERIZATIONS 
One conception of Canadian strikes sees them as a central stratagem of 
North American business unions (Smith, 1972, 1976). Business unions are 
led by people whose objective is to protect their job tenure and maximize 
their income. They accomplish this by delivering wage increases and im-
provements in fringe benefits to their members. Except perhaps at the level 
of rhetoric, they hâve little or no concern with the gênerai conditions of that 
portion of the employed population which is not part of their membership 
(cf. Bell, 1962). From this point of view, a strike can be seen as an invest-
ment; one foregoes income for a little while in the anticipation that sacrifice 
will yield a reasonable rate of return in the long run. It is true that strikers 
themselves may, at the outset of a strike, hâve unreasonable expectations as 
to what income increase they can hope for. In Ashenfelter and Johnson's 
(1969) formulation - which Smith adopts - the union leadership uses the 
strike to disabuse its members. The longer the strike, the more 'reasonable' 
the membership becomes. The point remains, however, that "the union 
leadership— maximizes its utility by acting in accord with the expectations 
of the rank and file" (Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969: 39) and does this by 
ensuring that the returns on an investment in a strike are maximized. Those 
returns are likely to be maximized where the bargaining position of labour is 
strongest; that is, under conditions of full employment. Hence, it has been 
predicted and found that the propensity to strike is inversely related to the 
rate of unemployment (Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969; Pencavel, 1970; 
Smith, 1972; Hibbs, 1976)2. This, then, is an explanation of temporal varia-
tions in strike propensities based upon a very calculative conception of 
strikes. 
i This paper is part of a larger project on industrial conflict in postwar Canada. For an 
early statistical treatment which stresses the difficulties involved in constructing a theory of 
strikes in Canada, see Chartier (1952). 
2 COUSINEAU and LACROIX (1976) using a différent spécification to Smith report a 
négative association between économie upswings and industrial conflict in Canada for the 
period 1967 to 1974. They infer that this indicates that the relationship between industrial con-
flict and the business cycle is "empirical" in the sensé that it cannot be theoretically predicted. 
Their reasoning is that, while increasing union agressiveness may tend to increase the level of 
industrial conflict during an upswing, the tendency of employers to give in will hâve a counter 
effect. For an attempt to theoretically specify the conditions that lie behind the positive 
association between the business cycle and industrial conflict that is more usually reported see 
Sapsford (1978). 
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For the purpose of this paper, the important thing to note hère is that 
Smith both asserts this position as an adéquate description of Canadian 
unions and rejects something that he calls a "Marxian theory of strikes" (in 
the 1972 paper) as well as a "militancy explanation" of the surge in strikes 
in Canada in the mid 1960's (in particular, in the 1976 paper). The latter 
kind of explanation is, of course, found in the paper by Crispo and Arthurs 
and reproduced in the Woods Report. 
Contrast this with another récent treatment of strikes. For Rinehart 
(1975), strikes in Canada as elsewhere are, fundamentally, one of a number 
of weapons used in "the war at the workplace". More generally, they hâve 
their origins in the effects of the évolution of capitalism on working condi-
tions. Work, it is argued, is alienating. Labour is treated as a commodity by 
employers so that work is organized in ways which maximize both the con-
trol of the employer over his labour force and the worker's productivity (cf. 
Stone, 1973). It is not normally organized in ways that guarantee some 
satisfaction to the individual worker. Consequently, survey data to the con-
trary notwithstanding3, work is inevitably experienced as oppressive by the 
overwhelming majority of workers. And, given the effect of capitalist com-
pétition on the rationalization of production organization, the extent and 
degree to which work is experienced as oppressive has increased and will 
continue to increase over time (cf. Braverman, 1974). 
Following from this, strikes which may be organized around économie 
issues hâve their roots in a more complicated set of phenomena. 
While many récent strikes hâve been obstensibly precipitated by infla-
tion and rising living costs strikes are a complex phenomenon which do 
not readily lend themselves to simple causal analysis. Most strikes arise 
out of a multiplicity of issues, and as they progress the relative impor-
tance of thèse often shifts. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the 
underlying causes of many work stoppages réside in the way in which 
the indus trial System is structurée!4. 
This is not to say that wages are not of continuing importance to work-
ing people. Rather, the wage question is hopelessly and inextricably tied 
in with other issues of a non économie nature. (Rinehart, 1975: 70-71). 
Given this kind of position it should not be surprising that Rinehart is 
much more favourably disposed towards Crispo and Arthurs as well as to 
the relevant passages in the Woods Report. Thus, Rinehart cites the follow-
ing conclusion of the Woods Report (1968: 99) approvingly: "Workers who 
hâve long resented their terms and conditions of employment and manage-
ments authority over them now seem to be reacting to an ever more basic 
grievance. An increasing number of workers appear to perceive an issue in 
the idea of work as it is now structured". 
3 In his 1978 paper, RINEHART is at pains to stress the weakness of survey research 
and his paper is addressed to the question of why workers appear relatively contented in survey 
research findings when they appear less contented in more qualitative research. 
4 The emphasis is mine. 
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The logical linkages in Rinehart's argument are not always as clear as 
one would like but he does seem to be arguing that, given the more 
generalized tensions in the work place that his model of industrial relations 
incorporâtes, the kinds of periodic escalation in the extent and intensity of 
industrial conflict reported by Jamieson (1968) are to be expected from time 
to time, including that escalation in industrial conflict that occurred in the 
mid 1960's. Moreover, and most importantly, given the tensions in the work 
place that are at the heart of Rinehart's characterization of Canadian 
strikes, one would not be surprised to see the more diffuse forms of conflict 
asserted by Crispo and Arthurs associated with a strike wave. Specifically, 
Rinehart refers to the following characteristics (borrowed from Crispo and 
Arthurs) of the mid 1960's strike wave. 
First, there was an unprecendented tendency for rank and file workers 
to refuse to ratify agreements negotiated by union leaders and the Com-
pany. Thèse actions indicated not only that workers lacked faith in 
union leaders but also that the expectations, grievances, and militancy 
of ordinary workers were greater than those of union officiais. A second 
feature of the mid -1960 era was the willingness of the labour movement 
to defy "law and order"; court orders were ignored and injunctions 
were violated. Third, an inordinately high proportion of work stoppages 
were accompanied by violence and illegality, including property 
damage, personal injury and death, and arrests and convictions. Final-
ly, an unusually high percentage of strikes were illégal; in 1966 about 
one-third of ail work stoppages were of the illégal variety. (Rinehart, 
1975: 69-70) 
Elsewhere, Rinehart cites Flood's (1972) paper on wildcat strikes in the 
1960's (1972) and the radicalism of Québec unions, especially as displayed 
in the Common Front strike of 1972. 
For both Smith and Rinehart, Canadian unions struggle relatively ag-
gressively to increase their members' incomes. But they diverge in their 
model of the relationship between union leaders and their members and it is 
in thèse contrasting images of the relationship between union leaders and 
members that their contrasting characterizations of strikes are substantially 
rooted. Unions aggressively pursue wage increases, according to Smith, 
because their members want them to. For Rinehart, union leaders côncen-
trate on income issues because that is the only viable course of action for 
them consistent with reasonably placid relations with the state (cf. Rinehart, 
1976: 29, 1978: 10)5. It is not because the aggressive pursuit of higher in-
come to the exclusion of job control issues accurately reflects the aspira-
tions of workers. Thus, for Rinehart there is a vast réservoir of discontent 
generated by the expérience of oppressive work to which unions in Canada, 
as in other capitalist societies, are structurally incapable of responding. In 
contrast to Smith who is asserting that his business union model of Cana-
5 "The stratégies of organized labour are more adequately explained by référence to 
structural constraints which oblige unions (under threat of destruction) to ignore questions of 
authority and control" (Rinehart, 1978: 10). 
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dian strikes exhausts what is interesting in understanding Canadian in-
dustrial relations in the mid 1960's, for Rinehart, the additional 
characteristics of the mid 1960's strike wave asserted, above ail, by Crispo 
and Arthurs, are centrally interesting because they are the surface effusions 
of the seething cauldron of discontent that lies below even apparently placid 
labour relations. 
LOGIC AND EVIDENCE 
We hâve, then, two quite contradictory characterizations of Canadian 
strikes which seem to particularly diverge in their interprétation of the surge 
of strikes of the mid 1960s. The first question to be dealt with is, are there 
any grounds for deciding which of thèse characterizations is the more adé-
quate? The second and subsidiary question is, how is it possible for two 
such contradictory interprétations to be held at the same time? 
The first of thèse two questions largely turns on the évidence that Smith 
on the one hand and Rinehart on the other, offer in support of their par-
ticular interprétation. Smith's model is derived directly from Ashenfelter 
and Johnson (1969) whose characterization of unions cornes from Ross 
(1948), one of a number of institutional labour economists writing along 
thèse Unes in the post war period (e.g. Dunlop, 1949; Lester, 1958). In part, 
then, the basis for Smith's business union characterization of Canadian 
unions cornes from the twenty-five year old observations of a group of 
American economists. The more important basis for Smith's characteriza-
tion of strikes, however, cornes from the statistical adequacy of the régres-
sion équations that his business union model leads him to construct. Strikes 
and man days lost are higher where unemployment is low for the periods 
analyzed by Smith6. Smith's contention is that "a Marxian theory of strikes 
suggests that unemployment créâtes unrest and basically political strikes so 
that unemployment and strikes would be positively related" (p. 669). The 
négative association between strikes and unemployment therefore is, for 
Smith, évidence of the inadequacy of a Marxist model and of the adequacy 
of the business union model. 
Moreover, since the bulk of the total variance in industrial conflict over 
the post war period analysed by him can be accounted for by an 
Ashenfelter-Johnson model using unemployment rate, a distributed lag of 
growth in real wages, quarterly dummies and a trend term, Smith asserts 
that one does not need to resort to "militancy" to explain what happened in 
the mid 1960's (in the way that Crispo and Arthurs do). If there was a surge 
in the number of strikes and man days lost in the mid 1960's that is because 
that was a period of low unemployment and accelerating inflation. 
6 SNYDER's (1977) results suggest that this may not be an entirely stable pattern as do 
my own results for Québec (Smith, 1979). 
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We can set aside Smith's allusion to a Marxist theory of strikes since it 
is at best naive, more probably silly, and certainly undocumented. Neither is 
his rejection of a "social-political view" of strikes (1976: 140) entirely per-
suasive. Crispo and Arthurs were not attempting to explain annual or 
quarterly fluctuations in their 1968 paper7. They were attempting to show 
(not very successfully, as we will see shortly) that industrial conflict in the 
mid 1960's displayed a set of distinctive characteristics which suggested that 
one could not understand it as simply a bargaining process. More specifical-
ly, they were claiming above ail that the composition of industrial disputes 
had changed with more involving illegalities and rank and file discontent 
with union leadership. It is upon thèse compositional changes that Rinehart 
pounced to provide évidence in support of his more gênerai characterization 
of Canadian strikes. Since it is the composition rather than the temporal 
distribution of strikes that is at issue, it should be clear that a négative tem-
poral association between the rate of unemployment and industrial conflict 
is entirely compatible with the positions taken by Crispo and Arthurs8 and 
by Rinehart. If, for example, workers wished to express their disgust at op-
pressive working conditions (because of their affluence and years of éduca-
tion) or the légal institutions for dealing with industrial disputes in this 
country, there is much to be said for doing so when their actions hâve the 
most force and when they are least personally threatening. It is surely possi-
ble for workers to be radical without being stupid. 
In other words, Crispo and Arthurs presented a characterization (or, if 
one prefers, it, description) of Canadian strikes in the mid i960's which is 
not falsifiable through showing that temporal fluctuations in industrial con-
flict can be fitted to a model based principally on économie variables. Such 
data, at least in the form presented by Smith, simply does not speak to the 
issues raised by Crispo and Arthurs and to the more gênerai "social-
politicaF, characterization presented by Rinehart. This, I would argue is a 
nice illustration of one half of what I called a * 'dialogue of the deaf" at the 
beginning of this paper. 
The assumptions behind the "narrow économie interest,, model of 
strikes, then hâve by no means been demonstrated by the temporal associa-
tions that hâve been found with fluctuations in unemployment. What of the 
model that Rinehart offers, a model which stresses the evolving character of 
capitalism and its effect on work expériences? It is surely not enough to 
sketch out a range of objectively alienating conditions of modem work. 
What is at issue is the reaction of workers to those conditions. Rinehart's 
7 It is true that CRISPO and ARTHURS do refer to rising levels of time lost through 
strikes as one of their indicators of what is spécial about the 1960's. But that remains only one 
of a whole séries of attributes of mid 1960's industrial conflict that they assert as distinctive. 
8 "While rank and file militancy and lawlessness hâve appeared of late in an unusually 
potent combination, some weight must be given to the view that our présent difficulties may be 
simply part of the price of prosperity. Yet even to say this is to say something quite disturbing, 
for it suggests that a free society cannot maintain a period of sustained économie advance 
without engendering serious industrial unrest". (Crispo and Arthurs, 1968: 239). 
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view is that we could see symptoms of generally alienated labour, in the con-
text of a trade union movement incapable of dealing with the sources of that 
aliénation, in the features of the strike wave of the mid 1960's asserted by 
Crispo and Arthurs. As we saw above, he drew attention to rank and file 
contract rejections, wildcat strikes, violence and illegality in industrial 
disputes and the radicalism of Québec unions. I am not at ail convinced that 
the évidence for Rinehart's characterization is much more persuasive than 
the évidence for that of Smith. There are problems both at the level of the 
facts themselves and the interprétation of those facts. 
Crispo and Arthurs' paper either directly or through the Woods Report 
is one of the principal sources for Rinehart's assertions. But, what is treated 
as "based upon fragmentary and impressionistic évidence" in Crispo and 
Arthurs' original paper (1968: 246) reappears as hard fact in Rinehart's 
restatement. There is, as a matter of fact, scarcely any évidence at ail in 
Crispo and Arthurs' paper. Not one of their claims is documented with any 
kind of reasonably systematic data collection. Neither has subséquent 
research tended to support their assertions. The only évidence on rank and 
file contract rejections cornes from the United States (Simkin, 1968). There 
are no adéquate séries on rank and file contract rejections in Canada. Their 
assertion with respect to increased turnover of union leaders in the i960's 
appears to be entirely mistaken. Chaison and Rose (1977) hâve, in fact, 
shown that the rate of turnover of union leaders fell in Canada in the 1960's 
as compared to the 1950's9. 
Crispo and Arthurs claimed that wildcat strikes were another symptom 
of the unusual turbulence of the industrial conflict of the mid 1960's and of 
rank and file restiveness in particular. Rinehart, presumably, on the basis of 
Crispo and Arthurs' paper has asserted the same thing10. The issue hère, one 
would assume, is whether or not the proportion of strikes which were 
wildcats increased in this period. After ail, if the propensity to strike in 
gênerai tended to increase in the 1960's because the bargaining position of 
labour was stronger, one should not be surprised to see the number of 
wildcat strikes increase too. Flood's 1972 paper shows a fairly marked in-
crease in the proportion of short strikes (he uses the number of strikes of 
less than 5 days as one index of wildcat strikes) from the mid 1950's to a 
plateau from 1960 to 1966. But that does not cover a long enough period to 
allow assessing whether or not the mid 1960's were distinctive11. More in-
9 It remains true that CHAISON and ROSE do not include data on the reasons for 
union leader turnover in their analysis. It is possible that the higher rate of turnover of union 
leaders in the 1950's has something to do with the âge pyramid of the union leadership. In the 
1950's union leaders may hâve left office voluntarily through retirement or death whilst in the 
1960's, many of them were forced out of office. But still, it remains the case that what évidence 
there is does not support Crispo and Arthurs' claim. 
10 In the context of a discussion of wildcat strikes RINEHART has asserted the follow-
ing: "The major wave of strikes that hit Canada in the mid '60s was characterized by rank and 
file actions taken independently of the union hierarchy". (Rinehart, 1976: 32). 
n FLOOD's analysis deals with the period 1956 to 1969. He also présents data on the 
number of strikes during term for the same period. It is not at ail clear why he présents the data 
on short strikes in a proportion form but does not do the same thing for strikes during term. 
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teresting is Clack's (1975) analysis of unpublished Department of Labour 
Data on the proportion of strikes taking place during the term of an 
agreement12. His results show an increasing proportion of strikes during 
term from about 1962 to a peak in 1966. But what is most striking about his 
results is that they show that the surge in the proportion of strikes during 
term in the early 1960's is to a level substantially below that achieved in the 
immédiate post war period and even below the peak of the mid 1950's. In 
other words, while there may hâve been an increase in the proportion of 
wildcat strikes in the mid i960's from the rather low level at the very end of 
the 1950's, that level was in no sensé distinctive and cannot be used to 
demarcate the mid 1960's from the rest of the post war period13. In short, 
wildcat strikes were not proportionately distinctive in the mid 1960's. 
There remain two sorts of évidence that might be seen as indicating 
some rather profound changes in Canadian industrial relations in the mid or 
late 1960's. The first is Jamieson's (1970) suggestive évidence on the in-
cidence of violence in industrial conflict. Combining the number of strikes 
involving "violence, illegality and légal penalties" (Jamieson, 1970: 24) 
given by Jamieson with data on the total number of strikes in Strikes and 
Lockouts, one can calculate that 36% of ail strikes involving violence, il-
legality and légal penalties between 1901 and 1970 occurred between 1957 
and 1966 whereas only 23% of ail strikes between 1901 and 1970 occurred 
between 1957 and 1966. Jamieson's data, then, suggest that violent and il-
légal strikes were overrepresented in this period. The problem hère is that 
figures of this sort are sensitive not only to the willingness of workers to 
violate the law but also to both changes in the law and to changes in the en-
forcement policies. Without information on both the évolution of the law 
and of enforcement policies, the figures are extremely difficult to interpret. 
The other pièce of évidence that might suggest a real change in in-
dustrial relations during the 1960's is the character and form that the 
Québec labour movement has corne to display. There is no question that 
Québec unions hâve corne to display a quite remarkably radical character 
-especially in 1972 (cf. Ethier, Piotte and Reynolds, 1975) - but we hâve no 
real évidence that what has happened in Québec represents the tip of an 
iceberg of worker radicalism in Canada. It is at least as likely that the events 
were highly spécifie to Québec. Moreover, both the leadership of the CSN 
and of the CEQ appear to hâve been quite markedly out of step with their 
membership. The former experienced substantial membership losses after 
1972 (Dupont and Tremblay, 1976) and the latter has recently had a good 
part of its leadership, including its président, voted out of office. 
12 Strictly speaking, the distinctive characteristic of a wildcat strike is that it occurs 
without the sanction of the strikers' union. But divining the exact intentions of a union in that 
kind of situation is not at ail easy. While strikes during the term of a contract may hâve union 
support, since they are generally illégal, they will usually not be supported by the union. Conse-
quently, the number of strikes during the term of an agreement is a reasonable index of the 
number of wildcat strikes. 
13 It is worth noting that CLACK finds that to the extent that there is any overall trend in 
the proportion of strikes during term over the post war period, it is a downward trend! 
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In short, the distinctive compositional characteristics that are at the 
core of Rinehart's characterization of Canadian strikes are either difficult 
to establish or simply false. They certainly hâve not been established by 
Rinehart. 
But the problem is more fundamental than that. The kind of "dialogue 
of the deaf" that I am describing is only possible where data are treated as 
unambiguously in favour of one position when, in fact, the évidence is en-
tirely equivocal. For example, what if one could show that within the post 
war period, the mid 1960's increase in the number of wildcat strikes really 
was distinctive? Rinehart (1975: 72) claims that, ''Wildcat strikes are a form 
of protest with clearcut radical dimensions". His reasoning is that, by 
définition, they involve stepping outside the institutional structure by which 
industrial disputes are regulated. That is, in principle they are affronts to 
union authority (and, for Rinehart, unions are buttresses of the status quo); 
they reflect workers aspirations in a direct manner, unmediated by a union 
bureaucracy; and, in Canada, they are generally in violation of labour law 
(cf. Woods and Ostry, 1972). Ail of those observations are, of course, 
generally correct. We do not know how many wildcat strikes hâve tacit 
union approval, but there is no reason to think that they are a majority. 
Generally speaking, it is probably reasonable to assume that wildcat strikes 
are both an affront to unions and to the law14. 
Yet, if wildcat strikes are "radical" it is presumably because they either 
strive for or accomplish (or both) some real changes in the authority struc-
ture of the workplace. Thus, Rinehart (1975: 73) claims that: "Rarely do 
workers initiate wildcat strikes over wage issues". His view is that they are 
more likely to be concerned with the organization of work in the plant. A 
number of writers hâve argued that "whereas économie rewards in the 
capitalist enterprise can be collective, job creativity-control rewards are 
largely distributive" (Mann, 1973: 21) so that there is something intrinsical-
ly radical about striking against issues related to the organization of work in 
the plant rather than wages (Gorz, 1967; Giddens, 1973). The reasoning 
hère is that claims over wages can be met out of productivity growth 
whereas claims with respect to the organization of work cannot be met ex-
cept through a rearrangement of the authority structure of the capitalist 
enterprise. Hence, if wildcat strikes are not over money but rather over the 
organization of work and if challenging the organization of work is in-
herently radical, it follows that wildcat strikes are inherently radical too. 
Now, for obvious reasons there is only a limited amount of informa-
tion available on wildcat strikes, especially on wildcat strikes in Canada. 
The most detailed case study of a Canadian wildcat strike is that of Maxwell 
Flood (1968). Several aspects of that strike bear on the discussion hère. The 
first is that it appears to hâve had its immédiate cause in discontent with 
u Although even this needs qualifying, Crispo and Arthurs claim that "only in a tiny 
fraction of cases are criminal penalties actually invoked" (1968: 241). This seems quite pro-
bable and suggests that wildcat strikes are rather more "institutionalized" than is sometimes 
thought. 
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monetary clauses in a contract that the union involved had just negotiated. 
Secondly, Flood cites concern over wage relativities as a source of tension 
which facilitated the occurrence of the dispute. There had been a spec-
tacular wage settlement in the news and, in addition, some contract work 
was being performed at the plant by workers with équivalent jobs to some 
of the regular workers in the plant - but at higher rates of pay. Thirdly, 
while Flood does claim that anxiety over technological change in the plant 
was another source of * 'tension", he has no method for demonstrating this. 
That would require, for instance, showing that, other things being equal, 
workers most threatened by technological change had been most likely to 
participate in the wildcat. He présents no data to that effect. In other 
words, the events in "Lake City" appear to be consistent with (and certain-
ly not to contradict) an explanation of the strike in terms of a wage issue. 
Such évidence as there is for other countries does not clearly indicate 
that wildcat strikes are preponderantly over issues other than wages or are 
particularly radical for that matter. One country which is distinguished by a 
strong shop floor organization and a fairly large number of wildcat strikes 
is Britain (Royal Commission, 1968). This is especially true of the 
automobile industry for which, in addition, we are fortunate to hâve some 
excellent research reports available (Clack, 1967; Turner, Clack and 
Roberts, 1967). In the automobile firm studied by Clack, a séries of "unof-
ficial disputes" were overwhelmingly concerned with wages. Moreover, the 
source of discontent was the wage relativities between catégories of 
workers. The discontent in the automobile plant studied by Clack had as its 
most tangible focus the incomes received by other workers. And it needs to 
be stressed that the striking workers did not attack the right of managers to 
introduce wage relativities; they pressed managers to adjust the relativities 
in existence15 
I would not dream of generalizing the findings of Turner, Clack and 
Roberts or of Flood to ail wildcat strikes in ail countries. There is no doubt 
that some wildcat strikes are indeed profoundly radical in precisely the sensé 
understood by Rinehart16. It is upon those that Rinehart, rather selectively, 
rests his case. But whether most, or even a substantial minority, are is much 
less clear. In short, even if in Canada the proportion of wildcat strikes had 
increased in the mid i960's, there are no real grounds for concluding that 
necessarily reflected a bubbling through of discontents with the organiza-
tion of work on the part of workers or of anything particularly radical. 
15 GALLIE's (1978) superb récent study of workers in British petroleum refineries finds 
precisely this kind of dissociation between criticism of management in conjunction with an ac-
ceptant of the legitimacy of management. The British workers that Gallie studied were critical 
of the way their managers did their jobs but simply wanted those managers to do a better job. 
They did not envision replacing the managers with some kind of participative structure. 
16 The most well known study of a wildcat strike by a sociologist (Gouldner, 1954) does 
tend to fit Rinehart's interprétation. The author argued that although the actual issues focused 
on in the strike were monetary, the real reason for the strike lay in a number of changes in the 
organization of production. For further empirical évidence of this sort of thing along with an 
interesting theoretic discussion, see Herding (1972). 
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Rinehart, then, argues forcefully for a characterization of Canadian 
strikes as something more than a struggle over wages17. For him, compéti-
tion leads to an ever more rationalized and ever more oppressive kind of 
production organization at the same time that the union movement is struc-
turally incapable of dealing with that oppressiveness. Consequently, under 
appropriate conditions, workers will necessarily organize protests against 
production organizations themselves (wildcat strikes) and against the in-
stitutions of labour relations (the unions and the law). Rinehart found sup-
port for this characterization in the Woods Report. But to adopt Rinehart's 
position requires an unreasonably uncritical acceptance of a set of fun-
damentally untenable assertions made by Crispo and Arthurs. At the same 
time, Rinehart does not even trouble to réfute Smith's alternative 
characterization of Canadian strikes18 or, more generally, the work of in-
stitutional labour economists like Ross, Dunlop and Lester. They appear to 
be firmly assigned to an alternative and presumably misguided intellectual 
tradition. 
On the other hand, Smith couples an alternative characterization of 
Canadian strikes with an attack upon Crispo and Arthurs by quite seriously 
misrepresenting the intentions of their paper. He présents it as an attempt to 
explain quarterly or annual fluctuations in industrial conflict in Canada 
when it is nothing of the sort. Crispo and Arthurs' paper attempted to show 
that the strikes of the mid 1960's in Canada suggested that industrial rela-
tions had qualitatively changed. In my view, Crispo and Arthurs in this 
respect need to be treated with very great scepticism indeed. But if one takes 
seriously the possibility of an alternative characterization it is necessary to 
confront the empirical issues raised by that characterization head on. Did 
the proportion of wildcat strikes increase? Was there an increased turnover 
in union leaders? Did the rank and file reject more contracts? Smith, whom 
one suspects had already made ùp his mind about the character of Canadian 
industrial relations before he examined his data, did not choose to do so. A 
set of régression équations which did not confront the issues raised by 
Crispo and Arthurs were simply a décorative adjunct to Smith's reaffirma-
tion of the particular orthodoxy to which he suscribes19. We can see how ef-
fective doctrinal blinkers can be if we consider the context within which 
n This is not, of course, to argue that he claims that strikes do not involve a concern 
with wages. It is simply to say that he argues that we cannot properly understand them without 
taking into account "other" dimensions. 
18 SMITH's paper appeared in 1972, some three years before the publication of 
Rinehart's Tyranny of Work. And Rinehart does discuss FLOOD's paper which appeared in 
the same issue of Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations. 
19 TURNER (Jackson, Turner and Wilkinson, 1975: xii) puts the same point in a 
characteristically éloquent fashion. "Econometric techniques of analysis hâve great instrumen-
tal value, but one of their more ambiguous qualities is that they are also often a device to make 
restricted numerical data go a long way in terms of quasi-scientific prestige, or a methodology 
the aesthetic and technical appeal of which misleads its own practitioners as to its verificatory 
content". This is not to argue against the use of econometric techniques but rather, against 
their misuse. 
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Smith has been assertirig that one could adequately characterize Canadian 
unions as business unions. To do so requires that he completely ignore the 
history of Québec unions. The CTCC always did distinguish itself doctrinal-
ly from U.S. based international unions, at first in a more conservative 
form (cf. Saint-Pierre, 1975; Monière, 1977) and then after it had deconfes-
sionalized and become the CSN in a more radical form (cf. Tremblay, 
1972). And latterly, both the CEQ and the FTQ hâve also taken directions 
of which, for instance, George Meany would surely not approve (cf. 
Drache, 1972). 
In short, neither Smith nor Rinehart persuasively demonstrates the 
superiority of their respective characterization of Canadian strikes. Both 
Smith and Rinehart make assumptions about the nature of strikes which are 
supported by nothing more than some crudely illustrative material. 
This paper has had an entirely négative character. I do not assert an 
alternative to either of the characterizations of Canadian strikes that I hâve 
discussed. Nor do I corne down on one side as opposed to the other. In my 
view, there is not nearly enough adéquate empirical material to do so. My 
purpose hère has been to draw attention to the fact that there are alternative 
and contradictory models of Canadian strikes which are cheerfully 
subscribed to by différent kinds of scholar, each relatively oblivious to the 
work of the other20 or of the other's intellectual tradition. But most impor-
tante of ail, discussions of the character of Canadian strikes suggest that 
those involved in the discussion hâve already made up their respective 
minds. Where "data"21 fits an argument it is accepted uncritically by 
Rinehart. Where hypothèses are tested by Smith they do not properly 
distinguish between characterizations although Smith claims that they do22. 
Scholars are not superhuman and we are ail most certainly prone to lapses 
of this sort. But unless a debate which focuses on critical and relevant data 
is more seriously engaged in by the proponents of alternative positions, 
there are no very real reasons for the gênerai public to take the participants 
in the debate at ail seriously. 
20 Thus , if Smith is at ail familiar with any of the sociological research dealing with the 
attitudes of workers towards work, their employers and their unions , he gives no évidence of it. 
That is unfor tunate since such research usually employs research methods which are more ap-
propriate for sorting out those att i tudes than the methods Smith uses. And , at least some of it 
provides éléments of support for Smith 's posit ion. For example, Goldthorpe et al. (1968), 
al though dealing with British data is relevant in several respects. 
21 I am using the term " d a t a " loosely hère to include the assertions made in C R I S P O 
and A R T H U R ' s paper . 
22 Only, of course, with respect to Crispo and Ar thu r s ' posit ion. Smith does not con-
front the broader position taken by Rinehart . 
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Caractéristiques des grèves au Canada: 
quelques commentaires critiques 
Avant d'expliquer un phénomène social, il est nécessaire de décrire ou d'ex-
aminer ce phénomène. Il y a au moins deux façons de caractériser les conflits in-
dustriels canadiens du milieu de la décennie 1960 et elles sont tout à fait contradic-
toires. La première façon est celle qui assume que certaines conclusions du Rapport 
Woods au sujet de ces grèves sont justes; l'autre rejette ces conclusions. L'objet de 
cette étude est de montrer comment ces deux caractéristiques posent de sérieux pro-
blèmes. 
La caractérisation des grèves au Canada est considérée par D.A. Smith (1972, 
1976) comme un stratagème généralisé des «syndicats d'affaires». Pour Smith, les 
grèves sont des instruments pour assurer des augmentations de salaires «réalistes» 
aux syndiqués. Rinehart (1975, 1976, 1978), d'autre part, souligne que ce sont pas 
seulement les enjeux économiques qui conduisent aux conflits industriels. Tout aussi 
importants sont les problèmes généraux découlant de l'aliénation en milieu de 
travail. Rinehart prétend que l'inquiétude des travailleurs relativement à l'organisa-
tion de la production a tendance à être camouflée par les dirigeants syndicaux qui 
privilégient les enjeux économiques. Mais, en dépit de la priorité des dirigeants syn-
dicaux accordée aux questions économiques, l'effet de l'aliénation au travail ressort 
à peine partiellement voilé des statistiques canadiennes sur les grèves. 
Selon un article de Crispo et Arthurs (1968), les auteurs du rapport Woods 
firent valoir que les conflits industriels au Canada, pendant la décennie 1960, 
manifestaient un militantisme marqué. Par exemple, ils se référaient au rejet des con-
ventions collectives par les syndiqués de la base, au mépris de la loi et de l'ordre et à 
une prédominance des grèves sauvages. Rinehart utilise ces conclusions du rapport 
Woods comme une preuve à l'appui de sa caractérisation générale des grèves au 
Canada. Smith tente de réfuter ces conclusions. 
Smith démontre que les variations dans le temps dans les conflits industriels au 
Canada peuvent s'expliquer en particulier par les variations dans les taux de chômage 
et les changements dans les taux des salaires réels. Ceci conclut-il, indique que nous 
pouvons comprendre ce qui est arrivé au milieu de la décennie 1960 comme étant une 
nette répercussion des conditions normales du marché du travail. En conséquence, 
point n'est besoin de l'expliquer par le militantisme syndical. Rinehart, d'autre part, 
voit dans la non-ratification des conventions collectives, les grèves sauvages et la 
violence auxquelles se réfère le rapport Woods, la preuve d'une insatisfaction 
généralisée du milieu de travail et de la direction syndicale dont on peut s'attendre à 
ce qu'elle génère des conditions de travail troublées. 
La thèse de D.A. Smith n'apprécie pas adéquatement les points soulevés dans le 
rapport Woods. Il concentre l'attention sur la répartition des grèves dans le temps, 
alors que c'est leur contenu qui est en jeu. Pour réfuter l'explication du «militan-
tisme», Smith devait démontrer que les prétentions du rapport Woods au sujet des 
rejets de conventions collectives, des grèves sauvages, etc. étaient fausses. 
Rinehart assume que les affirmations de Crispo et d'Arthurs au sujet des grèves 
sauvages, etc. qui furent retenues dans le rapport Woods, sont vraies. Mais, en fait, 
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il n'y a pas de preuve absolue que des changements qualitatifs dans les conflits in-
dustriels au Canada se soient produits au milieu de la décennie 1960 comme le sou-
tiennent Crispo et Arthurs. Et il y a quelques indices qui contredisent ces préten-
tions. La thèse de Rinehart affirme aussi que les grèves sauvages ont un caractère 
véritablement radical. Mais cela ne se vérifie pas clairement non plus. 
En conclusion, on peut dire qu'il y a matière à scepticisme au sujet des 
caractérisations des grèves au Canada telles que présentées à la fois par Rinehart et 
Smith. Ce qui est le plus troublant relativement à la façon d'envisager les conflits in-
dustriels chez chacun de ces auteurs c'est, cependant, leur tendance à éviter de con-
sidérer des caractérisations qui pourraient être différentes des leurs. 
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